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Abstract 
 
This study aims to examine the impacts of ownership structures (foreign ownership, linearity of foreign ownership, state 
ownership, and linearity of state ownership on corporate performance using a panel data from Malaysia listed companies over 
a period of 2000 to 2009. Weighted Least Square (WLS) models are used to test the relationships. The results show that the 
impact of foreign ownership is positive and significant on corporate performance while the impact of state ownership is negative 
and significant on corporate performance. These results suggest that foreign ownership enhance corporate performance while 
state destroys corporate performance. Furthermore, the results also show that foreign and state ownerships have linear 
relationship with corporate performance. This study concludes that an increase in foreign ownership states may enhance 
corporate performance as linear relationship exists. Finally, this study provides evidence that investors may make appropriate 
investment decisions to invest in the companies linked with foreign ownership. 
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 Introduction 1.
 
Relationship of ownership structures and corporate performance is discussed widely in corporate governance literatures. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that a high percentage owned by shareholders has a strong monitoring role to monitor 
managers, therefore reduce agency costs which helps firms to maximize their value. On the other hand, Berle and Means 
(1932) argue that managers with lower percentage of ownership may deploy their control for benefit themselves rather 
than maximizing shareholders value. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) use a cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 
companies in 1980 to re-examine the relation between ownership structure and performance. They use Market to Book 
Value Ratio (MTBVR) as a performance measure and board ownership as a minimum stake of 20% owned by 
shareholdings of all board members. They show no significant relation in the linear regressions using either MTBVR or 
accounting profit rate as performance measures. However, Benson and Davidson (2009) and Coles, Lemmon and Felix 
Meschke (2012) find that inside ownership has a significant linear relationship with corporate performance in their recent 
studies. 
There is an increased recognition on the importance of foreign ownership in emerging markets. Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) argue that foreign ownership performs an effective monitoring function of the firm management. Foreign 
ownership often contributes to managerial and organizational capabilities by providing organizational resources and 
knowledge in addition to financial capital. Hence, Chibber and Majumdar (1999) argue that foreign ownership may 
impose more resources to knowledge transfer. Foreign ownership tends to impose a good corporate governance 
practices in companies that invest in them. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) report that several countries have increasingly 
opened their markets for attractive foreigners vary across countries with different legal system and corporate governance 
mechanism. For example in Malaysia, it has implemented important measure to attract and increase foreign investors to 
hold majority stakes in most listed companies as mentioned in the New Economic Model (NEM) in 2010. 
To effectively implement NEM policy to increase foreign investors stake in Malaysian market, good understanding 
of the relationship between ownership and corporate performance is needed. One of the important issues in the 
relationship is linearity. The relationship could be linear and nonlinear. If the linear relationship exists, the performance 
improved and the policy is effective to implement. Otherwise the policy will be not supported. Most of Malaysian previous 
studies focus on foreign ownership only (see for example, Lau & Tong, 2008; Sulong & Mat Nor, 2010; Najid & Abdul 
Rahman, 2011). Therefore, this study will look at foreign ownership and the linearity impact of foreign ownership on 
corporate performance. 
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With respect of state ownership, previous studies argue that high state ownership has strong government 
protections and governance mechanisms and incentive to perform better (Le & Buck, 2009). In addition, state ownership 
can monitor managers and positively influence corporate performance (Jiang, 2004). In contrast, Estrin and Perotin 
(1991) state that companies with government ownership share do not focus on profit maximization because state has 
economic objectives and different political, and that lead to inferior corporate performance in that companies because of 
weaker corporate governance arrangements. State ownership is different than government ownership and this type of 
ownership can be clearly distinguished from government ownership in Malaysia although it is impossible to differentiate 
these two ownerships in China (Le & Buck, 2009). The study on state ownership and performance is limited in the 
Malaysian perceptive. Therefore, this study also looks at state ownership and the linearity effect of state ownership on 
corporate performance.  
 
 Literature Reviews and Hypotheses 2.
 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) argue that foreign ownership has experience in dealing with managerial opportunism and 
mitigating agency conflicts in different national and cultural settings. Douma, George and Kabir (2006) examine the 
impact of foreign ownership on corporate performance in India. They point out that foreign ownership has a positive 
impact on corporate performance because foreigners have sufficient corporate governance in the internal system of the 
companies. Ongore (2011) conducts a study in Kenya to test the impact of several ownership categories on corporate 
performance. He finds that foreign ownership has positive and significant relationship with corporate performance. 
Furthermore, he argues that foreign investors can help to enhance management system and easy access to massive 
resources. Phung and Le (2013) examine the effect of foreign ownership on corporate performance for a sample of all 
Vietnamese listed companies from 2008 to 2011. They show that foreign ownership is negatively related to corporate 
performance because it is not enough concentrated. Therefore, it is hypothesis that: 
 
H1a: foreign ownership has positive relationship with corporate performance  
 
Chhibber and Majumdar (1999) and Taylor (1990) argue that foreign ownership can easy access to superior 
technical, managerial talents, and financial resources. Kim (2013) and Stulz (1999) argue that foreign ownership has 
strong monitoring of managers and reduced agency costs, thus leads to better performance. Furthermore, Kim (2013) 
states that managers in companies with large foreign ownership have sufficient control role because they focus well on 
long-term value. Thus, it can argue that when foreign ownership has more concentrated, foreign investors play a 
significant monitoring role in companies. Furthermore, when it has more concentrated, foreign ownership may enhance 
corporate performance because foreigners can transfer their resources such as financial and technological resources to 
the companies (Huang & Shiu 2009; Gurbuz & Aybars 2010). Therefore, it is also hypothesis that: 
 
H1b: foreign ownership has inverted U-shaped relationship with corporate performance  
 
Wang (2005) conducts his study in China using a panel data of all initial public firm-year observations listed on 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) during a period of 1994 to 1999 to test the 
impact of state ownership on corporate performance. He finds that state equity ownership has positive impact on 
corporate performance, meaning that state can monitor managers and lead to better performance. In contrast, Pervan, 
Pervan and Todoric (2012) study the influence of state ownership on corporate performance for a sample of all Croatian 
listed firms. They show that state ownership is negatively related to corporate performance. This finding is in line with Sun 
and Tong (2003), Qi, Wu, and Zhang (2000) in China, Ongore (2011) in Kenya, and Andres (2008) in German. On the 
other hand, Hess, Gunasekarage, and Hovey (2010) use 97 randomly selected Chinese sample during the period of 1997 
to 1999. They show that state ownership is not associated with corporate performance. Therefore, it is also hypothesis 
that: 
 
H2a: state ownership has negative relationship with corporate performance  
 
Sun, Tong, and Tong (2002) examine the linearity effect of state ownership for a sample of listed firms in China 
during a period from 1994 to 1997. They find that state ownership has an inverted U-shaped with corporate performance, 
meaning that a high state ownership initially increases performance, but performance after certain level decreases. 
However, Yu (2013) investigate the relationship between the linearity of state ownership and corporate performance 
using a panel data of Chinese listed firms from 2003 and 2010. He finds that state ownership has U-shaped relationship 
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with corporate performance. Suggesting that as the size of shareholders by state increases, firm performance initially 
decreases and then increases. Further, Hess et al. (2010) use a balanced sample of 5170 firm-years of Chinese listed 
firms during a period of 2000 to 2004 and they reconfirm that state ownership has U-shaped relationship with corporate 
performance. Therefore, it is also hypothesis that: 
 
H2b: state ownership has U-shaped relationship with corporate performance  
 
 Methodology 3.
 
This study uses a sample of 190 non-financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia over the period of 2000 to 2009. Data 
was collected for these companies in respect of the period 2000 to 2009 or up to the year before delisting. This procedure 
leads to the final sample of 1716 company-year observations. MTBVR is used as the dependent variable to measure 
corporate performance. Further, ROA is a common accounting measure of corporate performance also used for 
robustness check because MTBVR in emerging markets with weak shareholder protection can be biased (Claessens & 
Djankov 1999). The data on ownership is hand collected from annual reports while the rest of the data is collected from 
DataStream. Table 1 presents measurements of the variables used in the study.  
 
Table 1. Measurements of variables 
 
Variables Descriptions
Dependent variables 
MTBVit Market to book value of company i in year t. MTBVR is measured by market price-year end / 
book value per share 
ROA Return on assets of a company i in year t. ROA is measured by [(net income before preferred 
dividends + (interest expense on debt-interest capitalized) * (1-tax rate)] / average of last year's 
and current year’s total assets * 100. 
Independent variables 
Foreign ownership (Ownership it) Foreign ownership in company i in year t.
State Ownership (Ownership it) State ownership in company i in year t.
Firm Size (LN (FSIZE)it) The natural logarithm of total assets of company i in year t.
Firm Age (LN (FAGE)it) The natural logarithm of firm age since listed on BM of company i in year t. 
Leverage Ratio (LEVit) Long term debt divided by total assets of company i in year t.
Profitability (PROFit) Operating earnings divided by total sales of company i in year t.
Investment (INVit) Capital expenditure divided by total sales of company i in year t.
Capital intensity (CAPINit) Tangible assets divided by total assets of company i in year t.
Liquidity (LIQUIDit) Cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets of company i in year t.
 
To identify the specific effect of ownership on corporate performance, this study uses firm age, firm size, leverage ratio, 
profitability, capital intensity, investment, and liquidity as control variables that might affect performance. However, the 
effects of these seven variables are not clear (see Amran and Ahmad (2010) and Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) for firm 
size, firm age, and leverage; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang (2000) for profitability; Konijn, Kräussl, and Lucas (2011) for 
investment and Capital intensity; Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) for liquidity).This study uses Panel data to analyze the 
affect of independent variables on performance. A panel data analysis is used because it can eliminate the unobservable 
heterogeneity that exists in the sample (Himmelberg, Hubbard, &Palia, 1999). Panel data is also used because it gives 
researchers a large number of data points, increases the degree of freedom, and decreasing the collinearity effects. It 
also improves the effectiveness of statistical estimates (Hsiao, 2003). The following models are estimated: 
Corporate performanceit = B0 + B1Ownershipit + B2 LN (FSIZE)it + B3 LN (FAGE)it + B4LEVit+ B5 PROFit+ B6INVit+ 
B7CAPINit+ B8LIQUIDit+ eit 
Corporate performanceit = B0 + B1Ownershipit + B2 Ownership2it + B3 LN (FSIZE)it + B4 LN (FAGE)it + B5LEVit+ B6 
PROFit+ B7INVit+ B8CAPINit+ B9 LIQUIDit+ eit 
Where the variables are described in Table 1 
 
 Results and Discussion 4.
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. The mean values for MTBVR and ROA during 
2000 to 2009 are 1.177 and 0.031 respectively, which indicate that within this period the market appreciate listed 
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companies in average. However, the range of MTBVR and ROA are from lowest value of -240.380 and -1.058 to highest 
value of 36.170 and 6.786 respectively. The table also shows that while foreign ownership accounts for a higher 
percentage in ownership structures of listed companies with a mean of 4.240, the mean value of state ownership only 
0.012. This indicates that in average foreign ownership is concentrated, but not state ownership. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MTBVR -240.380 36.170 1.177 6.350 
ROA -1.058 6.786 0.031 0.209 
FO 0.000 57.510 4.240 7.008 
STATE 0.000 0.62 0.012 0.066 
FAGE 0.000 3.610 2.430 0.533 
FSIZE 7.474 18.451 12.879 1.404 
LEV 0.000 24.099 0.113 0.598 
PROF -164.397 151.468 0.113 5.952 
INV 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.001 
CAPIN -86.462 17.734 0.419 3.592 
LIQUID 0.000 3.365 0.051 0.158 
Notes. Total number of observations for all variables are 1716, For the definition of variables refer to the table 1. 
 
Pearson’s correlation is used to measure the degree of relationship between the independent variables in this study. 
Table 3 presents the correlation results. Based on the results, none of the correlation coefficients has a value higher than 
0.8 or 0.9, which show that there is no problem of multicollinearity (Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, & Lee, 1988). 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix between variables 
 
Variables MTBVR ROA STATE FO FAGE FSIZE LEV PROF INV CAPIN LIQUID 
MTBVR 1    
ROA 0.106(**) 1    
STATE -0.013 -0.014 1    
FO 0.003 0.024 -0.056(*) 1    
FAGE 0.023 0.029 -0.028 0.107(**) 1    
FSIZE 0.016 0.027 0.033 0.215(**) 0.332(**) 1    
LEV -0.004 -0.008 -0.009 0.004 -0.011 0.008 1    
PROF 0.012 0.088(**) 0.000 0.027 -0.012 0.101(**) 0.001 1    
INV 0.017 0.033 -0.017 0.007 -0.068(**) -0.050(*) 0.000 0.451(**) 1   
CAPIN -.0050(*) -0.418(**) 0.007 0.012 0.023 0.097(**) -0.480(**) 0.015 0.006 1  
LIQUID 0.011 -0.011 -0.001 -0.045 0.022 -0.186(**) -0.033 0.007 0.024 0.015 1 
Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; For the definition of variables refer 
to the table 1. 
 
Table 4 shows the empirical results of OLS and WLS estimations. Results of OLS are summarized in column 2 and 
column 4 of Table 4. It shows that OLS method suffers from heteroscedasticity problem based on Cook-Weisberg (CW) 
or Breusch-Pagan (BP) test that gives value 107.43 and 107.43 respectively with p-value of 0.000. Since OLS estimation 
suffers from heteroscedasticity problem, WLS is used. 
The results of model (1) using WLS presented in column 3 and column 6 of Table 4. The result shows that foreign 
ownership is positively and significantly related to corporate performance. This finding is consistent with hypothesis (1a). 
It indicates that foreign investors may monitor the management of companies more closely and hence improve the 
company performance. As they hold a larger stake in a company, their wealth is more tied to the performance of the 
company. Thus, they have more incentive to monitor managerial behaviors and ascertain that managerial actions are 
congruent with wealth maximization. The results also show that the effect of firm age is negative on corporate 
performance while the effects of firm size, the profitability, and liquidity are positive on corporate performance.  
The result of the impact of state ownership on corporate performance has the result of coefficient consistent with 
the hypothesis (2a) which means that higher ownership by the state government does not lead to better monitoring. This 
result is consistent with findings by Pervan et al. (2012) Sun and Tong (2003) and Wei and Varela (2003). The results of 
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model (2) using WLS are also presented in column 4 and column 7 of Table 4. It shows that foreign or state ownership 
have linear relationship with corporate performance. These findings are not in line with hypothesis (1b) and hypothesis 
(2b). 
 
Table 4. Model (1) Regression results of OLS and WLS methods  
 
Variables Regression result of foreign ownership on company performance 
Regression result of state ownership on company 
performance 
 OLS WLS OLS WLS 
Const -0.498(0.741) 
0.198
(0.280) 
0.085
(0.602) 
-0.487
(0.743) 
0.161
(0.377) 
-0.117 
(0.495) 
Ownership -0.125(0.953) 
0.388
(0.066)* 
0.302
(0.239) 
-1.254
(0.5879) 
-0.805
(0.003)*** 
-0.234 
(0.724) 
Ownership2   0.559(0.253)   
-1.926 
(0.131) 
FAGE 0.213(0.486) 
-0.177
(0.000)*** 
-0.128 
(0.000)*** 
0.205
(0.503) 
-0.181
(0.000)*** 
-0.119 
(0.000)*** 
FSIZE 0.094(0.442) 
0.088
(0.000)*** 
0.089
(0.000)*** 
0.095
(0.426) 
0.094
(0.000)*** 
0.106 
(0.000)*** 
LEV -0.391(0.181) 
-0.034
(0.562) 
0.028
(0.771) 
-0.392
(0.179) 
-0.044
(0.451) 
0.036 
(0.712) 
PROF 0.003(0.898) 
0.013
(0.000)*** 
0.006
(0.022)** 
0.003
(0.900) 
0.013
(0.000)*** 
0.006 
(0.021)** 
INV 241.788(0.523) 
45.601
(0.350) 
74.840 
(0.004)*** 
238.919
(0.528) 
44.122
(0.379) 
72.551 
(0.001)*** 
CAPIN -0.123(0.011)** 
-0.013
(0.324) 
-0.036 
(0.413) 
-0.123
(0.011)** 
-0.015
(0.258) 
-0.037 
(0.389) 
LIQUID 0.551(0.577) 
0.2914
(0.016)** 
0.331
(0.005)*** 
0.553
(0.576) 
0.296
(0.014)** 
0.302 
(0.001)*** 
R2 0.004 0.041 0.068 0.004 0.044 0.096 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.037 0.063 0.001 0.041 0.092 
F-statistic 1.034 9.318 13.930 1.071 9.953 20.356 
P-value(F) 0.407 0.000 0.000 0.381 0.000 0.000 
DWT 
F-critical (dL ) 
2.216
(1.879) - - 
2.216
(1.879) - - 
BP/CWT 
 
107.43
(0.000) - - 
107.43
(0.000) - - 
Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; For the definition of variables refer 
to the table 1. 
 
 Robust Analyses 5.
 
In order to provide a robustness of the results, this study uses ROA as an alternative measure of corporate performance. 
The result of model (1) and model (2) using ROA as dependent variable is summarized in table 5. The results show that 
the model using ROA as company performance variable has consistent with hypothesis (1a) and hypothesis (2a). 
Furthermore, the results also show that the model using ROA as corporate performance variable has not consistent with 
hypothesis (1b) and hypothesis (2b). This implies that foerign or state ownerships have linear relationship with market 
and accounting performance measures. 
 
Table 5. Model (1) and (2) Regression results of WLS method using ROA as corporate performance 
 
Variables Regression result of foreign ownership on company performance 
Regression result of state ownership on company 
performance 
Const -0.09(0.000)*** 
-0.059
(0.000)*** 
-0.094
(0.000)*** 
-0.095 
(0.025) 
Ownership 0.036(0.059)* 
0.048
(0.107) 
-0.060
(0.005)*** 
-0.381 
(0.115) 
Ownership2  0.041 0.673 
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(0.593) (0.166) 
FAGE 0.007(0.013)** 
0.007
(0.000)*** 
0.007
(0.007)*** 
0.006 
(0.477) 
FSIZE 0.008(0.000)*** 
0.005
(0.000)*** 
0.008
(0.000)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
LEV -0.028(0.000)*** 
-0.036
(0.000)*** 
-0.031
(0.000)*** 
-0.096 
(0.000)*** 
PROF 0.003(0.000)*** 
0.002
(0.000)*** 
0.003
(0.000)*** 
0.003 
(0.000)*** 
INV -13.068(0.042)** 
-9.161
(0.071)* 
-13.313
(0.033)** 
0.425 
(0.968) 
CAPIN 0.001(0.401) 
0.009
(0.073)* 
0.001
(0.476) 
-0.032 
(0.000)*** 
LIQUID 0.007(0.355) 
0.005
(0.623) 
0.008
(0.310) 
0.003 
(0.892) 
R2 0.079 0.086 0.082 0.247 
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.081 0.078 0.243 
F-statistic 18.518 17.852 19.267 62.197 
P-value(F) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; For the definition of variables refer 
to the table 1. 
 
 Conclusion  6.
 
This study examine the relationship between foreign ownership, linearity of foreign ownership, state ownership, and 
linearity of state ownership using a panel data of 190 Malaysian listed companies during a period of 2000 to 2009. WLS 
model is used in this study to estimate the panel data regression. The results of WLS show that foreign ownership is 
positively related to corporate performance while state ownership is negatively related to corporate performance which 
indicates that foreign ownership enhance corporate performance while state ownership destroys corporate performance. 
The results also show that foreign or state ownership have linear relationship with corporate performance. 
In practical perspectives, this study provides evidence to policy makers that government’s proposal to increase 
foreign stake in Malaysian market as mentioned in NEM is supported because the increase in foreign states may improve 
corporate performance as a linear relationship exist. Moreover, to investors, the results of this study provide evidence that 
investors may make appropriate investment decisions to invest in the companies linked with foreign ownership. The 
theoretical implication of this study is that agency problem decreases in companies with foreign ownership while it 
increases in companies with state ownership. Furthermore, agency cost eliminates in companies with ownership 
concentration as government’s NEM expects.  
Future research that tries to investigate the relationship between ownership structures with corporate performance 
can include other variables such as firm risk and industry effects to ensure the robustness the results. Other performance 
measures can also be used as a proxy for company performance e.g., return on sales (ROS), return on investments 
(ROI), profit margin (PM), and economic value added (EVA). Then, the results can be compared with this study. This 
study focuses only on foreign ownership and state ownership for their influence on corporate performance. However, 
further research could be conducted in order to examine the other types of ownership such as domestic ownership and its 
linearity on corporate performance.  
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